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1 Introduction
Memorably in Nature, Jerry Coyne likened recalcitrant debates between species experts to bar-
nacles on a whale, saying they “retard slightly the progress of the field” (1992, 290). However,
experts have been happy to agree on at least this: species are evolving lineages.1 The impor-
tance of that putative fact, and of agreement about it, have been emphasized for over twenty
years (Ereshefsky 1992a; Mayden 1997; de Queiroz 1998). Recent review works reaffirm both
(e.g., Camargo and Sites 2013; Zachos 2016). But this lends some urgency to the unhappy
fact that the exact nature of the implicated evolving lineages remains unclear (Haber 2013, 341;
Richards 2010, 142; Barker andWilson 2010; Pigliucci 2003, 598). Great, species are evolving
lineages—but what are those, exactly?
To help with that evolving lineage problem, a main aim of this paper is to address it with
a new theory. This proposes that in some and perhaps many cases being an evolving lineage is
being a metapopulation feedback system. Technicalities aside, such a lineage is an active, dynamic,
fluid thing, analogous to a functioning termite mound. The mound is a system sustained (with
fluctuations) by feedback relations between O2:CO2 ratios, duct geometry, ambient conditions,
and termite building behaviors (Turner 2008). Analogously an evolving lineage system features
recurring feedback, though between quite different variables, including between earlier and
later instances of gene flow, niche sharing, and trait frequency similarities between populations.
The recurring feedback often diachronically sustains the lineage system through perturbations,
ensuring it is no mere metapopulation and rather is something more self-sustaining that snakes
its way through evolutionary space at temporal and spatial scales we struggle to conceptualize.
More technically, such a system has a property called metapopulation feedback cohesion,
represented by variable M . Values of this variable vary dynamically with the frequency and
magnitude of feedback relations between causal variables within the metapopulation feedback
system. Below, exact conditions for being an evolving lineage are proposed in terms of M
and multi-dimensional variable spaces that help represent the contrasting values M can take
in various groups of populations. The variable spaces can also help better specify familiar ideas
about species and other evolving lineages, and to empirically test some of those ideas.
The paper’s conclusion is not that the feedback theory of evolving lineages is true or probably
true, or even that we now have enough reason to adopt it. It would be preposterous for a first
paper on a theory of this sort—and by a philosopher—to aim so high. This paper must instead
be devoted to clarifying core concepts, empirical assumptions, and predictions, and to lending
these the initial plausibility that would motivate the later modeling and testing that any claims
to truth or adoption would require. Accordingly, the paper’s conclusion is that it would be
worthwhile for some of the interdisciplinary community of researchers working on species and
evolving lineages to collaboratively further develop and empirically test the feedback theory of
evolving lineages elaborated here.
The paper’s overall argument for that conclusion involves showing how the feedback theory
can improve upon existing theories of evolving lineages that underlie various species concepts.
For example, while many species concepts imply that evolving lineages of the species type are
distinguished partly by so-called “species cohesion” (see Brooks and McLennan 2002; Barker
and Wilson 2010; de Queiroz 1998, 68), some underlying theories of evolving lineages imply
that this cohesion is an effect diachronically downstream of, caused by, and thus in a sense
separate from causal variables such as gene flow, niche sharing, and so on (see Barker andWilson
2010). In contrast, the feedback theory proposes the relevant cohesion just is (or is realized or
implemented simultaneously by) the feedback relations involving causal variables. There is no
1Or segments of such lineages. See de Queiroz (1998).
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need to posit some further diachronically downstream thing beyond the causal variables and
feedback relations themselves.
Some other extant theories do not imply the relevant cohesion is some separate downstream
thing; instead they describe it as some overall state of causal integration between populations.
However these alternative theories (e.g., Hull 1976; Grant 1980; Wiley 1981; de Queiroz 1998;
Ereshefsky 2001) have so far been vague, offering none of the precision about causal variables
and interactions that would help frame subsequent quantitative modeling and testing. The
feedback theory begins getting more exact, stating and vividly depicting conditions for being an
evolving lineage which advise new focus on recurring or cycling feedback, the potential impor-
tance of which has been overlooked when thinking about the nature of evolving lineages.
The feedback theory also clarifies how trait frequency similarities may play surprising causal
roles within feedback relations—how they may be causal variables just like gene flow and niche
sharing and so on. This motivates us to think more carefully about a widely perceived opposition
between, on one hand, theories that base the nature of evolving lineages in causal relations, and,
on the other, theories that base it in similarity (e.g., Hull 1976; Ereshefsky 2001). For instance
Hull once lamented that some authors think trait similarities are more “fundamental” than inter-
breeding to evolving lineages of the species type, while he oppositely urged that interbreeding is
more “fundamental” (1981, 145). Those sorts of fundamentality claims become dubious upon
recognizing both interbreeding and trait similarities as just two among other important causal
variables, between which it is the recurring feedback relations that constitute lineages. How-
ever, this new view of lineage constitution also leaves open, and may help clarify the reasons for
thinking, that non-causal forms of similarity are not among the conditions constituting evolving
lineages, even if they are among important diagnostic conditions or grounds for inductions and
explanations appealing to lineages.
Readers already familiar with how existing theories could be improved upon may wish to
skip now to Sections 6–9, which unpack the details of the feedback theory of evolving lineages.
The sections prior to those clarify what the evolving lineage problem is about (Section 2), how
it is subtly distinct from related problems (Section 3), how existing attempts to solve it can be
sorted and criticized (Section 4), and how this yields lessons for new theories to heed (Section
5). It is then that Sections 6–9 unpack the feedback theory and show it heeds the identified
lessons, with Section 10 summarizing the overall argument.
2 What the Evolving Lineage Problem is About
Although the evolving lineage problem involves the very nature of evolving lineages being less
clear than we would like, we can start with a minimal characterization and clarify basic terms.
Here ‘evolving lineage’ minimally means a group of populations that actively evolve to-
gether by partaking in evolutionary processes that connect them (Ereshefsky 1992a).2 They
are frequently called “evolutionary units” (Ereshefsky 1991) and described as dynamic or “ac-
tive” (Ereshefsky 1992a, xiii; and see Eldredge and Cracraft 1980; Wiley 1981) and “functional”
(Baum 2009, 74). To borrow David Hull’s words, they “evolve, split, bud off new species …
etc.” (Hull 1981, 146).
Several authors have noted a distinction between this type of lineage and the monophyletic
clades that are also often called lineages and recognized as taxa when reconstructing phylogenies
2As we will see, some of the candidate connecting processes are driven partly by population level properties,
and yet some of the candidate metapopulations will not be monophyletic clades well suited to phylogenetic analysis.
So there will be a sense in which we sometimes are discussing matters that fall in between the levels that Willi
Hennig labeled “phylogenetic” and “tokogenetic”, respectively (1966, 29).
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(e.g., Cracraft 1989a; Kimbel and Rak 1993; de Queiroz 1998; Baum 2009). Due to this
distinction, such clades are not the focus of this paper.3
As groups of populations, the evolving lineages of interest here are metapopulations. This
distinguishes them from the many other types of lineage we find at different levels or scales of
biological hierarchies and which may be said to evolve, such as mtDNA lineages, gene lineages,
and so on (Haber 2012).4 I use ‘metapopulation’ to mean any group of populations, each made
up of organisms.5 On this use of the term, only some metapopulations will count as evolving
lineages.
When referring to such lineages, many authors have implicitly or explicitly had only species
in mind. But others have implied that some more and some less inclusive metapopulations may
also be evolving lineages (Ereshefsky 1991; Barker and Wilson 2010). An ecumenical way to
frame this is to say that when authors use the term ‘species’ to refer to a category of evolving
lineages, it is possible—and up for further investigation—that this is a sub-category belonging
to a broader category of evolving lineages. Granted, it may turn out that the sub-category
associated with species is of so much more interest than the others that we should eventually
reserve our use of the term ‘evolving lineage’ for just that sub-category. But my feedback theory
will for now use ‘evolving lineage’ in the more inclusive way, while having to draw mostly upon
discussions of species for its input material. Moreover, it may turn out that we should recognize
an even more inclusive use of ‘evolving lineage’, so that the kind of evolving lineages that the
feedback theory is about are just one among several kinds, perhaps with some species being of
the feedback sort and other species of other sorts.6 The feedback theory proposes to be about
only some rather than all evolving lineages, though its potential to simultaneously respect and
integrate pluralist ideas should become clear.
3 The Problem Itself
The problem, as intimated most recently by John Wilkins (2018, ch. 14), is that we lack a
relatively exact, comprehensive, and widely accepted theory of what evolving lineages are, even
though so many authors have claimed these are fundamental units in biology.7
3It is clear that the evolving lineages discussed here are probably often not monophyletic clades, with some
authors arguing that they cannot be (e.g., de Queiroz 1998). This doesn’t imply that my project is of no interest
to phylogeneticists. Baum (2009) clarifies that well-known phylogeneticists such as Hennig and Wiley and de
Queiroz nonetheless view species as evolving lineages in the present sense.
4Asmetapopulations, evolving lineages are surely composed in various ways by lower level lineages (Haber 2012).
This will matter to a full understanding of the lineages I focus on, though will be set aside for this paper’s upstream
aim of outlining a new direction in which we might begin building a fuller understanding.
5There are disputes about what, exactly, the terms ‘metapopulation’, ‘population’, and ‘organism’ should mean.
For present purposes I must take these terms as well enough understood, and I provisionally presuppose some-
thing like Millstein’s interactionist view of metapopulations and populations (2010) and Wilson’s tripartite view
of organisms (2005). Caveats: Millstein’s stipulation that all members of a metapopulation or population are con-
specific needn’t and shouldn’t be adopted a priori in the present discussion of evolving lineages, and I am open to
both pluralist and conventionalist takes on ‘metapopulation’, ‘population’, and ‘organism’ (e.g., Barker and Velasco
2013; Stegenga 2014).
6In other words, an “evolving lineage pluralism” akin to “species pluralism” is an option I leave open.
7Several other authors (e.g., Haber 2013, 341; Richards 2010, 142; Pigliucci 2003, 598) have implied the same
when discussing views that offer a theory of evolving lineages, and some of those views will be discussed below.
Notice that although it is tempting to infer from the lack of an exact, comprehensive, and widely accepted theory
of evolving lineages that it is hopeless to search for such a theory, the history of science shows such an inference
is itself suspicious. History suggests verdicts often should wait for exact and comprehensive theories to evaluate
(Stanford 2010), and that, however frustrating for our own careers, this can take centuries longer than we have so
far been working on the concept of an evolving lineage.
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To avoid dead ends and talking past one another, it is crucial to clarify this problem by
distinguishing it from closely related ones, such how to detect (or diagnose) evolving lineages.
Recent advances in so-called species delimitation methods (see Camargo and Sites 2013), the
merger of phylogenetic systematics and phylogeography (Edwards 2009), and the integration
of traditional and more genomic methods of lineage detection (Dayrat 2005; Will et al. 2005;
Bond and Stockman 2008; Padial et al. 2010; Schlick-Steiner et al. 2010; Schmid-Egger et
al. 2017) give grounds for thinking we have made significant progress on the problem of detect-
ing evolving lineages. But as several detectors themselves emphasize, that problem is primarily
epistemological or operational while the evolving lineage problem is primarily ontological or
theoretical (e.g., Camargo and Sites 2013). Knowing how to detect or tell that a thing is an
evolving lineage is not necessarily the same as knowing what conditions are responsible formak-
ing a thing an evolving lineage. The former type of knowledge often rests largely on measuring
properties that correlate (in telling ways for us) with being an evolving lineage, while the latter
is about learning the conditions that underlie those correlations and constitute being an evolving
lineage. Progress of the first sort often outstrips progress of the second for long periods of time.
Researchers made great advances in using imaging technology, including X-ray radiographs as
early as 1896, to tell when someone had cancer, even though many fine details about underlying
conditions constituting cancer were yet to come (Grigg 1965).
So to address the evolving lineage problem is to develop a theory about which conditions
constitute being an evolving lineage.8 This is not (yet anyway) a search for the surely vast number
of long and winding etiological pathways leading to conditions that make something an evolving
lineage. Rather, for now, it is about clarifying constitutive conditions themselves—those that
suffice in usual contexts to make a metapopulation an evolving lineage, regardless of the paths
by which those conditions were achieved. Return to cancer: there are conditions that constitute
a cell or cells being cancerous, and there are also (a great many) etiological pathways that can
lead to those conditions.
A search for constitutive conditions should also be distinguished from related but more
metaphysical debates about whether these linages are sets, individuals, natural kinds, and so
on (e.g., Ghiselin 1974; Hull 1976; Kitcher 1984; Boyd 1999). Those debates are downstream
of the constitution problem because we cannot settle whether evolving lineages are individuals,
sets, kinds, or what have you, without learning more specifically which conditions constitute
being an evolving lineage.9 So although this paper will suggest the feedback theory gains some
of its plausibility from getting more exact about views of evolving lineages that have motivated
claims about their metaphysical status, such status is not a primary focus here.
Perhaps it is the detection problem that seems most relevant to the evolving lineage problem
and its focus on constitutive conditions. And recent progress in the detection of evolving lin-
eages has informed my feedback theory to some degree. But unfortunately there has been very
little explicit attempt to use the detection work to inform our views of evolving lineage consti-
tution. Instead, much detection work has proceeded as though the constituting conditions are
settled enough and we can focus just on the detection (Camargo and Sites 2013; Zachos 2016,
8This needn’t implicate any dubious essentialism. The heterogeneity within metapopulations suggests a good
theory of evolving lineage constitution will abandon traditional essentialism in favour of more liberal views, on
which various sets of conditions can each, in usual contexts, make a metapopulation an evolving lineage (Wilson,
Barker, and Brigandt 2007).
9Echoing Hull (1976) and others, Crane (2004, especially 165–6) argues for this point, with respect to species
in particular.
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108–9).10 Thus, rather than dwelling primarily on recent detection work, I will primarily turn
to the sources that detectors themselves have turned to: species concepts.
4 Existing Views of Evolving Lineages
Species concepts are distinguished from each other in part by the definitions of ‘species’ they
each propose plus elaborations of those definitions. Many specialists now distinguish between
species concepts that are strictly epistemological (or operational), and those that are ontological
(or theoretical) (Mayden 1997; Zachos 2016).11 The latter class is the relevant one here, and it
can itself be sub-divided in several ways.
The sub-division used below starts from the fact that ontological species concepts tend to be
based on a shared and very general idea, one that is seldom noted but which different researchers
specify in different ways, leading to different ontological species concepts. The general idea is
that one or another pattern of cause-and-effect associates with being a species. In addition
to there being different ways of specifying this pattern, there is implied disagreement about
which parts of the pattern are constitutive of being a species—are the parts of the pattern that
a theoretical definition of ‘species’ should refer to as definitive.
That general idea is in fact old. Darwin expressed a version of it when saying “intercrossing
plays a very important part in nature in keeping individuals of the same species, or of the same
variety, true and uniform in character” (Darwin 1859, 103). According to that version the
pattern of cause-and-effect that associates with being a species involves intercrossing as a cause
and character uniformity as effect.12 Below, more contemporary ontological species concepts
are sub-divided into those that specify the general idea in a cause-focused way, and those that
do not. We’ll see how these two classes are underpinned or motivated by two different views
of evolving lineages.13 As figure 1 summarizes, I will argue that, so far, none of these views of
lineages are both exact and comprehensive about lineage constitution. But they contain strengths
to build upon.
4.1 Examples of cause-focused ontological species concepts and some problems
Proponents of cause-focused species concepts define ‘species’ by appeal to the causes that they
think are most important within whichever cause-and-effect pattern they associate with species.
10It is very tricky business to determine what should count as settled enough. Settled enough for what? There are
many reasons aside from detection that biologists and philosophers of biology may want a better theory of evolving
lineage constitution. But even if detection is your only interest, it is risky to suppose that a better constitution theory
will be of little detection help. This is partly because the history of science shows that impressive detection progress
often gets even better with progress on constitution problems (often called conceptual problems)—think again of
cancer. But it is also because the supposition of “little help” is about a better theory that we have not yet developed.
Without some researchers developing the theory, how can we tell it will be of little detection help? In any case,
subsequent sections in the text clarify existing views of evolving lineage constitution in a way that suggests further
developments in this area would be worth attempting for many purposes.
11Which species concepts should be classified as epistemological and which ontological is a delicate matter. I
roughly follow Barker’s (2017) sorting of concepts.
12Other things Darwin said about species have generated debate about whether he believed the species category
to be objective. One way to express his ambiguity on the matter is to say he thought the cause-and-effect pattern
in question was reasonably objective (with some vagueness and variation objectively present no doubt), but also
thought it was sometimes arbitrarily that experts identified just species with this pattern, since the pattern seems to
sometimes hold for things other than groups deemed species, and other times does not hold for some of the groups
recognized as species. The quoted passage shows he thought it sometimes held for varieties too, for example.
13This is sometimes explicit in the authors’ discussions of their definitions of ‘species’, other times implicit. Barker
clarifies this in terms of underpinning (2010, 86ff.), Ereshefsky in terms of motivation (1992b, 682).
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Figure 1: Some Species Concepts and Problems for Them Sorted
Subsequent elaborations of, and rationale for, these definitions often discuss distinguishing ef-
fects as well, but the effects are not a definitional focus.
For example, in his 2000 version of the biological species concept (BSC) Mayr wrote “I
define biological species as groups of interbreeding natural populations that are reproductively
isolated from other such groups” (2000b, 17). This appeals to a two-fold cause—genes flow-
ing between conspecific populations (interbreeding), and genes not flowing between those and
other populations (reproductive isolation)—without suggesting what the effect in question is.
In Mayr’s associated discussions he sometimes roughly followed Darwin by implying “pheno-
typic uniformity” is a distinguishing effect (e.g., 1963, 521–22, 2000a, 161).14 And it seemed
to be phenotypic discontinuities he had in mind when he said it was the job of a species concept
to answer the questions “Why is not the organic world a single continuity? Why has nature
…favored the discontinuities among the species?” (Mayr 2000a, 161; see also Coyne and Orr
2004). But he also explicitly qualified that the effect of phenotypic uniformity within a species,
and its flip side of phenotypic discontinuity between species, was not to be a focus of the defi-
nition of ‘species’ itself (e.g., 2000b, 17). So, while Mayr thought these uniformity effects are
parts of the cause-and-effect pattern associated with being a species, he seemed to exclude them
from the parts of the pattern also deemed constitutive of being a species.
By “phenotypic uniformity” Mayr had mostly in mind the phenotypic traits of organisms,
but the uniformity he referenced was at the population level. It referred to frequencies of these
traits being more similar between conspecific populations than between these and out-group
14As we’ll see Mayr had in mind a type of population level phenotypic uniformity, and Darwin likely was
thinking more at the organism level, or at least without the benefit of precision about the population level afforded
by population genetics. Also, Mayr sometimes identified “genetic cohesion” as a distinguishing effect and suggested
this was not simply a form of similarity though perhaps involved similarity (Mayr 1963, 521–22).
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populations (Mayr 1963, 2000a, 161; also see Templeton 1989, 159; Coyne and Orr 2004, 26;
Baum et al. 2013, 327).
It is common for proponents of cause-focused species concepts to have some such form
of population level similarity in mind as distinguishing effect (Barker and Wilson 2010; more
generally, see Beatty 1997). However, various forms of population similarities are implicated,
including molecular or genetic similarities (e.g., Mallet 1995), and sometimes similarity or uni-
formity goes by other names, including ‘homogeneity’ and especially ‘cohesion’ (e.g., Ellstrand
2014; Grant 1980; see Barker and Wilson 2010; Ereshefsky 2001, 1991; Mishler and Brandon
1987). Moreover, various degrees of similarity or cohesion are discussed, including populations
becoming homogenized in terms of just a few highly adaptive genes that are spread widely be-
tween and across them (e.g., Morjan and Rieseberg 2004). While proponents of cause-focused
species concepts often specify the different kinds and degrees of similarities with the precision
of quantitative population genetics, they nonetheless share Mayr’s preference for keeping these
effects outside the focus of their respective definitions of ‘species’. Their focus is on causes.
But there is disagreement about which causes are “main” or “most important”, and that’s
what differentiates cause-focused species concepts from each other. We have seen how the BSC
privileges gene flow as a cause (also see Morjan and Rieseberg 2004). Van Valen’s ecological
species concept (EcSC) emphasizes shared niches or selection regimes (1976). Templeton’s
cohesion species concept (CSC) in a sense combines the BSC and EcSC by appealing to both
sorts of cause (1989).
Underlying these different species concepts are differing views about which causes are most
important for populations cohering as evolving lineages more generally, whether as species or
more or less inclusive groups of populations. And each different underlying view of lineages
tends to implicate just one or some very small set of causes as most important, whether it be gene
flow, niche sharing, a combination of those, etc. So, let us say that these are each different narrow
cause views of evolving lineages, underlying the different cause-focused species concepts.15
A first problem for narrow cause views of evolving lineages stems from well-known criti-
cisms of the species concepts they underlie. Each is too narrow on its own. In many cases, for
instance, there are many important causes of the population level similarities in question (de
Queiroz 1998, 2007), and often it is their interactions that matter most. Analyses suggest that
excluding several of these causes from those parts of the cause-and-effect pattern(s) deemed
constitutive of being a species or other evolving lineage, in favor of just one or two causes, is un-
convincing on both empirical and conceptual grounds (Barker andWilson 2010; more generally,
see Beatty 1997).
A second problem for narrow cause views of evolving lineages concerns not their appeals to
causes, but rather how they often characterize similarity as effect. The characterization should
be more comprehensive, to better fit the idea that lineages are active, dynamic things. This
problem requires more introduction than the first because it is easy to misunderstand both it
and the involved appeals to similarity more generally. It is not that appeals to similarity in such
contexts are dubious in the same way as presumed by many attacks on species essentialism in
biology.
To explain this, consider how the type of similarity most disparaged in attacks on species
essentialism differ from the population level similarities at issue here. The attacked species
essentialist views imply that conspecific organisms are conspecific (at least partly) in virtue of
each possessing particular intrinsic traits that organisms of other species lack (e.g., Devitt 2008;
Caplan 1980; Kitts and Kitts 1979). Those similarities are trait-particular at the organism level.
15Templeton’s CSC may count as an important exception, depending on how you classify the causes he recog-
nizes within the constituting cause-and-effect pattern.
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The essentialists might say, for example, that organisms within the Damaralandmole-rat species
(Fukomys damarensis) are conspecific with each other partly because each of them has some
distinguishing set of genes, G. They would thereby imply that an organism without G wouldn’t
be conspecific with the organisms of that species.
Advocates of narrow cause views of evolving lineages, on the other hand, would not need
to tie conspecificity for the mole-rats to G in particular. This is trivially so for any advocate
who denies reference to trait similarities when saying what constitutes conspecificity, as Mayr
intended when explicitly keeping reference to similarity effects out of his definition of ‘species’
(Barker 2010, 76–79). But even if advocates decided the definition should now explicitly refer to
these similarities in addition to their causes, they would not thereby tie conspecificity, or lineage
identity, to particular intrinsic traits of organisms. Because the similarities they discuss are of
the population sort described above, they would merely be implying that—to put it roughly—
populations belonging to the same lineage aremore similar to each other than any is to out-group
populations, allowing that the particular traits in terms of which this is true change over time
without affecting conspecificity or lineage identity. In the Damaraland mole-rat perhaps it is
partly in terms ofG that such population level similarity holds now, but thousands of generations
into the future this sharing of G could evolve away, with the population level similarity that
helps distinguish the species then holding in terms of some newer traits. Such similarity is, at
the organism level, trait-neutral rather than trait-particular.16
But once the relevant population level trait similarities are vindicated in this way, there is
reason to view them in a broader or more comprehensive way than is typical—as more thanmere
effects, and rather as themselves causal as well. Minimally, and as elaborated below, it seems that
two populations having trait frequencies more similar to each other than to a third population
can help cause those two populations to be more similar than the third at a later time. This might
clarify or better capture what researchers have been thinking when describing evolving lineages
as active, dynamic entities in their own right. It is hard to see an evolving lineage as a dynamic
cohering entity, persisting continuously through time, if it amounts to just fits and starts of
other causes independently producing this instance of similarity, and then later that instance of
similarity, with no further causal linkage between such similarity effects. Recognizing the causal
status of similarities may show them to be among the linkages and suggest how to uncover other
linkages as well.17 Put differently, we should see whether bringing appeals to similarity further
in line with the more dynamic views of lineages to which they have sometimes seemed opposed
might, ironically, improve both—perhaps even unify them in a sense.
4.2 Problems associating with non-cause-focused ontological species concepts
In contrast to the cause-focused concepts, non-cause-focused species concepts define ‘species’
without privileging particular causes. Main examples are versions of the evolutionary species
concept (EvSC, Simpson 1961;Wiley 1981; Mayden 1997;Wiley andMayden 2000) and Kevin
16Perhaps if proponents of narrow cause views better saw how this shields them from pointed attacks on species
essentialism that are based on evolutionary considerations, they would be less reluctant to appeal to both causes
and effects in their definitions.
17Elliott Sober (1980) famously made a similar clarification about populations. He argued that an important
innovation in evolutionary thinking about them was recognizing that trait patterns at the population level at one
time can help causally explain population level trait patterns at later times. I am suggesting we extend this idea
from the population level to the metapopulation level, though with the appropriate modifications for this different
level.
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de Queiroz’s general lineage concept (1998), which he later refined into the unified species concept
(2005a).18
Proponents of these seem to have two main reasons for keeping causes out of the definitions.
First, they appreciate that narrow cause views are too narrow, and so they respond in a particular
way: be permissive about which causes are relevant, to the point of not appealing to them in
the definitions at all (e.g., de Queiroz 2005a). Second, they think the sense in which species
are cohesive evolving lineages is not emphasized enough (or in the right way) in cause-focused
counterparts, and so they make this the central piece of their characterizations of species. G. G.
Simpson, for instance, says such a lineage is one that evolves “separately from others and with
its own unitary role and tendencies” (Simpson 1961, 153). Ed Wiley and Richard Mayden
say such a lineage has its “own independent evolutionary fate and historical tendencies” (2000,
73). de Queiroz implies that an evolving lineage is an ancestor-descendent sequence at the
metapopulation level, with this comprising “connected subpopulations” (2005b, 6601). These
descriptions are deliberately broad, attempting to encompass the variety of ways in which a
metapopulation can be a cohesive evolving lineage. Hence, I call them encompassing views of
evolving lineages.
Critics have long noted these views are vague and ambiguous: too inexact (Ghiselin 1987;
Pigliucci 2003; Richards 2010; and see references in de Queiroz 1998, 69). But dividing this
criticism in two helps clarify things.
Suppose momentarily that these views are reasonable in not appealing to specific causal vari-
ables when describing what constitutes an evolving lineage. Are they thus appealing to just some
sort of lineage cohesion? If so, it seems like cohesion in a different sense than the trait simi-
larity sense of cohesion that we saw implicated in narrow cause views. Instead, encompassing
views seem to follow the lead of Hull’s seminal work (e.g., 1976) which, as Neto (2016) and oth-
ers have emphasized, uses ‘cohesion’ to capture how lineages are spatiotemporally continuous
wholes. This has also been described as a kind of integration or connectivity between populations
within a lineage (Mishler and Brandon 1987; Ereshefsky 1991; Wilson 1999; Ereshefsky 2001;
Barker and Wilson 2010). Even if such integrative cohesion sometimes involves similarities, it
is also in a sense over and above them. Rather than an effect variable within a cause-and-effect
pattern associated with lineages, it is more like the overall pattern itself, or a state of the whole
metapopulation sustained by the pattern featuring within it. But attempts to articulate this are
quite underdeveloped, leading to unacceptable implications. Implying that a metapopulation
features such integrative cohesion when conditions of “unitary role” or “historical tendencies” or
“connection between subpopulations” are satisfied is not exact enough about those conditions
to rule out some things that clearly should not count as evolving lineages (Pigliucci 2003).
Although I will refer to this inexactness problem as afflicting appeals to integrative cohesion,
the nub of it remains even if proponents resist talking in terms of such cohesion. Sticking
instead, for example, with the EvSC’s terms, many populations or subpopulations may be said
to manifest some unitary role, or display some historical tendencies, even though they are not
evolving lineages. Switching to the terms of the GLC and USC, it is harder to tell whether non-
evolving lineages will satisfy the conditions, because the conditions are even less clear. What
conditions give the implicated type of ancestor-descendent sequence its identity, setting it apart
as a sequence numerically distinct from others, or what conditionsmake a thing a separate ancestor
or descendent within such a sequence?19
18For discussion of similarities between de Queiroz’s concepts and EvSCs, see Naomi (2011) and Mayden
(2013).
19Some researchers have tried to defend against this problem by treating it as a problem for epistemological
lineage detection, rather than for the ontological views implied (de Queiroz 1998, 70; Zachos 2016, 107–8). This
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The second problem of inexactness for encompassing views is about causes rather than inte-
grative cohesion or its analogues.20 These views are inexact about causes because they imply we
should not appeal to causes when specifying the conditions for being an evolving lineage.21 As
a reaction to the problems for cause-focused views, this is an overreaction. Although biological
systems are too varied and complex to expect one or a small set of causes to be “most important”
in all cases of evolving lineage formation or maintenance, they are not so chaotic that anything
goes. If we think at least some significant number of (surely not all) evolving lineages are clearly
distinct from other sorts of things, we have prima facie reason to think there will be some recur-
ring patterns involving causal variables (probably many and involving complex interactions) that
help make these lineages distinct. Acknowledging that we have far to go on this part of a theory
of evolving lineage constitution would thus be better than a priori ruling out appeals to causes
from the start. The lesson should be: look for complex causal patterns, rather than simple ones
and rather than not looking at all.
5 Learning from Existing Views
Despite their problems, the views of evolving lineages that underlie ontological species concepts
also have strengths. To help learn what to aim for in a theory of evolving lineage constitution,
Table 1 shows both the strengths of existing views and lessons gleaned from their problems.
From the contents of that table, the next table, Table 2, then infers desiderata that a new the-
ory of evolving lineage constitution should meet and provides a synoptic preview of how the
feedback theory will meet those desiderata.
We see that we should get more comprehensive than narrow cause views of evolving lineages,
while also more exact than encompassing views. Steered by this guidance, the next two sections
introduce key ideas the feedback theory employs for meeting the desiderata. Based on these,
Section 8 then formulates constitutive conditions for being an evolving lineage.
6 Feedback in Evolving Lineages
First we get more comprehensive about causal variables, then about similarity.
6.1 Uncovering the relevance of feedback relations
It is not just that multiple causal variables, rather than just one or two, often importantly interact
to produce similarity at the population level. If we take a long enough view of lineages, these
variables seem mutually reinforcing over time. The key starting idea is to recognize much more
specifically that this is, perhaps often, feedback.22 Not feedback in a loose or metaphorical sense,
but rather in a literal and technical sense that is dynamically modeled in parts of engineering,
mistakes the problem. The problem is that the ontological conditions for being an evolving lineage are so inexactly
specified that many non-evolving lineages might satisfy them—or at least we can’t rule this out and the nature of
evolving lineages hasn’t been illuminated—even if our detection methods were perfect and told us of every trait
and every interaction of all organisms and populations. In such a fanciful case, we still wouldn’t know which of the
exhaustively accounted conditions are the ones that make a thing an evolving lineage.
20Henceforth, take the “or its analogues” qualification on such reference to integrative cohesion as implied.
21This implication is perhaps clearest in de Queiroz (2005a).
22This starting idea has some affinities with homeostatic property cluster (HPC) interpretations of theories in
biology about species taxa (e.g., Boyd 1999), and I was led to it after helping develop one of those interpretations
(Wilson, Barker, and Brigandt 2007). But the starting idea about feedback goes beyond those interpretations,
and the fuller feedback theory proposed below departs from them sharply. Boyd’s original HPC interpretation
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Appeal to exactly specified causal
variables underlying evolving
lineages.
Should appeal to more comprehensive set of causal
variables, to capture important patterns of
interaction.
Appeal to exactly specified effect
variables underlying evolving
lineages.
Should investigate the potential causal status of




Emphasize the integrative natures
of evolving lineages.
Should attempt to be more exact about what
integrative cohesion or relevant types of it involve.
Appreciate the involvement and
complexities of many causal
variables.
Should seek relevant patterns in interacting causal
variables rather than excluding appeal to them.
Table 1: Strengths and Lessons from Existing Views.
biochemistry, physics, and so on.23 Instantiations or increases in the value of some causal vari-
proposes that a species taxon is constituted by a set of properties that imperfectly cluster together, plus mechanisms
underlying the cluster (1999, 143). No one of the properties or mechanisms is strictly necessary for a group of
populations to be a species, nonetheless these tend to “co-occur” (1999, 143). Similarly, I will suggest multiple
causal variables are relevant, without insisting on the necessity of any one of them. A first difference clarifies upon
seeing that Boyd and I mean different things by properties and mechanisms vs. causal variables. By causal variables
I mean kinds of events, which are diachronic. By properties, and perhaps mechanisms (though not their operation),
he seems to imply synchronic dispositions, traits, capacities and so on. One sign that this difference is significant is
that it is part of Boyd’s claiming that species taxa are literally natural kinds, whereas I propose many of them are
literally feedback systems. Now it may be that they are both: although Boyd does not discuss feedback systems, he
does entertain the idea that a species taxon is both a kind and an individual, and he may count feedback systems
as individuals (among other things) (1999, 163). I am inclined to some version of such liberalism too, and will
clarify and maintain in my proposal an important role for (at least some of ) the similarity relations that Boyd argues
(1999, 165–69) are important. However, it is not clear how liberal Boyd is in the end, as he suggests his kinds
view is “opposed” to the view that species are “natural individuals” (1999, 167). A second and more biologically
relevant difference is that Boyd does not focus on dynamic feedback relations in particular. He writes in much
more general terms—of some cluster properties “favor[ing] the presence” of others, and underlying mechanisms
also “tend[ing] to maintain the presence” of cluster properties (143). Those relationships can be realized in a variety
of ways, without involving literal feedback at all. In contrast, feedback relations and details about them will below
become central to my proposal, especially in the articulation of a special kind of cohesion. This difference is to be
expected because Boyd was primarily addressing the metaphysical status of species rather than trying to break new
ground on the evolving lineage problem. The HPC interpretation by Wilson et al. implicitly hints at a role for
feedback relations (2007, 199–200), but like Boyd’s does not single them out as such nor elaborate on them as the
centerpiece of a proposal about the constitution of evolving lineages.
23In addition to the termite example already given, there is well-known focus on feedback relations in some
other areas of biology, where metapopulation evolving lineages are not the object of study. Consider chemotaxis
networks in bacterial navigation (e.g., Wadhams and Armitage 2004) and both ecological (e.g., Miao et al. 2017)
and eco-evolutionary dynamics in communities (e.g., Becks et al. 2012). Closer to the present topic, there is a long
though relatively spotty history, beginning with Darwin (Robertson and Grant 1996a, 10) and leading up through
Fisher (1930) and others to some contemporary researchers (e.g., Caporale and Doyle 2013; Lehtonen and Kokko
2012; Robertson and Grant 1996a, 1996b), of claiming that feedback relations are important to understanding
natural selection within a population. But the present topic of evolving lineages is about metapopulations, about
connections between populations that help set certainmetapopulations apart from others as species or other evolving
lineages. Although related, these two topics are quite distinct when it comes to constitution problems and providing
theoretical definitions of the related concepts. On the former topic, where feedback relations have periodically
been deemed important, the target concepts are NATURAL SELECTION and POPULATION; on the latter, where the
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Desiderata How Feedback Theory Will Meet Desiderata
1. Aim for relatively exact appeals to
causal variables that more
comprehensively capture their
relevant interactions.
Do this by proposing roles of feedback relations
between causal variables forming a metapopulation
feedback system.
2. Aim for relatively exact appeals to
trait similarity variables that more
comprehensively capture their status
as causes, in addition to effects.
Do this by accommodating variable t as both a cause
and effect variable within metapopulation feedback
systems, thereby motivating a shift in focus from
cohesion as unique effect variable inside a lineage
system, to cohesion as an overall integration of the
whole system.
3. Aim for emphasis of integrative
cohesion that more exactly specifies
what this is.
Do this by specifying integrative cohesion as
metapopulation feedback cohesion,M , a property of
metapopulation feedback systems.
4. Aim to be more exact about how
causal variables are involved in
integrative cohesion.
Do this by proposing thatM varies with the
frequencies and magnitudes of feedback relations
between variables in the metapopulation feedback
system.
Table 2: Desiderata for aTheory of Evolving Lineage Constitution. (Desiderata numbers do not indicate
relative importance within the list.)
ables at one time help produce subsequent instantiation or increase in those same causal variables.
The causal variables now feed into the same causal variables later, just as a turbo engine’s oper-
ation at one time produces output that feeds back into and amplifies its subsequent operation.
This can internally drive a metapopulation to persist as a lineage against forces that threaten its
overall coherence. It can also explain why sometimes the coherence is nonetheless lost, as, for
example, the threatening forces overwhelm the feedback relations, pushing the lineage over a
tipping point.
To clarify feedback between causal variables, consider Table 3. It lists and labels some of the
variables that authors have (explicitly or implicitly) appealed to when discussing how populations
within a species cohere, especially in the sense of how they are homogenized or become relatively
trait-similar at the population level.
Some of the variables in Table 3 will have more restricted relevance than others. Variable r,
for instance, will not apply for many metapopulations of asexuals. Also, the list is provisional
and surely incomplete. Experience suggests we will change the list. Empirical and conceptual
importance of feedback relations are here emphasized, they instead include EVOLVING METAPOPULATION LINEAGE
and SPECIES. I have yet to find anybody claiming particular feedback relations are part of what constitutes evolving
lineages, or that such lineages literally are feedback systems, or that definitions of concepts such as SPECIES should
be given in terms of feedback relations. Celso Neto entertains the importance of feedback relations when discussing
species cohesion, though in the more traditional terms of feedback relations within a single population; he says
“feedback relations between organisms and environment occur locally, usually on one geographic population” (Neto
2016, 144).
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Transmission of genes from one population to
another (e.g., via migration) can help cause
trait similarities between them.
Mayr 1970; Brooks and





Populations sharing selection regimes can help
cause trait similarities between them.
Ehrlich and Raven 1969;










Shared mechanisms of developmental
homeostasis between populations can help
causally sustain or increase trait similarities
between them.
Ehrlich and Raven 1969;
Mayr 1970; Wiley 1981
c Colo-
nization
When a representative off-shoot of a
population colonizes a new area, creating a new
population, this can causally account for some
later trait similarities between them.




When mutations are adaptive this can help
them spread across populations, contributing
to trait similarities between them.
Mayr 1970; Hellberg et





When opportunities for genetic recombination
within a genotype are restricted to certain
populations this can help sustain or increase
trait similarities between them (relative to
out-group populations).




Trait similarities between populations at one
time can help lead to trait similarities at a later
time.
To be discussed here.
Table 3: Provisional Running List of Causal Variables
work will recommend further specifying some variables.24 Others may be replaced.25 Some,
presently unappreciated, will be added. But the overall system of causal variables can survive
these changes, with our understanding sometimes improving because of those changes.
24For instance, although authors often cite gene flow as an important cause of cohesion in at least the trait
similarity sense (e.g., Mayr 1963; Morjan and Rieseberg 2004), they have long had more specific types of gene
flow in mind. These include instances of promotional gene flow that help homogenize populations by spreading
adaptive genes between them (Mayr 1970, 289, 300), and preventative gene flow that makes divergence between
populations less likely by “damping the occurrence of change within local populations” (Ereshefsky 2001, 115; also
see Mayr 1970, 168–69). A more recent example: transmission in bacteria of “niche-transcending genes”, which
sometimes helps homogenize groups of bacteria, but other times has the opposite effect (Cohan 2011).
25Given the examples in the previous footnote, perhaps g will later be replaced with a suite of more specific
gene flow variables; different types of shared selection regimes are recognized, including stabilizing and direction
regimes; and so on.
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The feedback theory predicts that feedback relations between at least some of the variables in
Table 3—both between different variables and between earlier and later instances or values of the
same variable—are often important for helping homogenize populations. To illustrate, consider
the species Alcantarea imperialis, a diploid, perennial, and outcrossing Bromeliad plant. Two of
its populations, A and B, reside about 100km apart in Brazil’s Atlantic Rainforest (Barbará et
al. 2007).26 Pollination is mediated primarily by bats and predicts relatively high levels of gene
flow between the populations (Barbará et al. 2007, 1989; I. Sazima, Vogel, and Sazima 1989; M.
Sazima, Buzato, and Sazima 1999). But measures suggest actual gene flow has been surprisingly
low, < 1Nem (Barbará et al. 2007). Also, the plant’s rosettes and bracts are often red or purple
but a green colour morph has arisen in populationA (Barbará et al. 2008). Suppose selection for
the green morph becomes very strong and when this is combined, at time t1, with the very little
gene flow that exists between A and B, this is enough for the green morph to begin spreading
through populationB as well. The adaptation involves bats strongly preferring the green plants,
and mediating pollination more frequently than before. This in turn helps cause an increase in
gene flow from B to A at a later time, t2. Thus instances of the causal variables g and s at t1
help cause later instances of g and s at t2.
This example may sound like a case of positive feedback. Positive feedback is often thought
of as disruptive or destabilizing, while negative feedback is considered a stabilizer. But neither
is always the case (Robertson and Grant 1996a). Also, what counts as stabilizing or destabi-
lizing depends on reference frame. Seeing the feedback in the Alcantarea imperialis example as
destabilizing is probably to use the initial values of g and s and the red and purple color traits as
reference frame. Relative to those, the feedback relations then hasten the system’s movement
to different states, e.g., to higher rates of gene flow and to new selection for the green trait. But
with, instead, the integration of populations A and B as the frame of reference, the feedback
seems less disruptive and rather contributing. And on either frame of reference, the feedback
relations seem important to changes of state in the metapopulation, changes that may seem at
first to threaten homogenization within the metapopulation, but which end up promoting it
through feedback.
There is no claim that causal variables at one time always help bring about later instances of
causal variables. Indeed, sometimes an interaction of g and s at one time help diminish g and
s at a later time. In bacteria in a Yellowstone hot spring, for instance, gene flow (via processes
such as lateral gene transfer) and selection at one time seem to have helped spread the genetic
control for a nitrogen fixing pathway between two populations; the shared pathway then was
leveraged in different ways by the two populations, helping them adapt divergently to different
thermal and nutrient zones, which in turn later diminished values of g and s between them
(Cohan 2011, 57). But such examples indicate that negative feedback, in addition to positive
feedback, is sometimes important within metapopulations, and in fields where feedback rela-
tions are given more attention the interactions between both positive and negative feedback are
also modeled (e.g., Ausborn, Wolf, and Stein 2009; Pfeuty and Kaneko 2009; Banerjee and
Bose 2008). So, on one hand, the feedback theory of evolving lineages does predict feedback
relations are important to homogenizing populations, and in ways that help sustain themetapop-
ulations they form as evolving lineages distinct from one another—there is nothing remarkable
about the described Alcantarea imperialis scenario, it seems routine. On the other hand, further
investigation of negative feedback and feedback interactions may lead the theory to also predict
upper limits to homogenization that help sustain metapopulations as evolving lineages from the
other direction—preventing their constituent populations from fusing into one vast population,
to which the prefix ‘meta’ would no longer apply. Such predictions would motivate the search
26Let A be the population that in the cited papers is labelled IJF, and let B be the population labelled IMC.
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not just for tipping points but also sorts of bi-stability that are familiar in some feedback systems
in other fields, and which would help further underwrite the individuality commonly attributed
to evolving lineages.
6.2 Trait similarity is just another variable in the system
To next get more comprehensive about similarity, the key idea is to recognize how some forms
of trait similarity, though typically treated as an effect variable, are probably often causal as well,
and enter into feedback relations within feedback systems, just like other variables.27
How can trait similarity cause things? Consider three of the Baltic Sea populations of willow
warbler (Phylloscopus trochilus) sampled by Bensch et al. (2009): one in Finland, one straddling
the Sweden-Finland border, and one in central Sweden. Let these be A, B, and C, respec-
tively.28 It is known that birds in A and B, belonging to the P. t. acredula sub-species, tend
to migrate south east towards southern Africa, adaptively avoiding geographic obstacles. But
many birds in C are instead hybrid crosses, resulting from matings between P. t. acredula and
another sub-species, P. t. trochilus, which displays different adaptive migration behaviors. The
hybrid C population is small and poorly adapted compared to the others. It is hypothesized
that many birds in C show deleterious migration behavior, rather than the adaptive migration
behaviors of, for example, most birds in A and B (Irwin 2009). Studies suggest these behaviors
are under strong genetic control (Pulido 2007). Simplistically, but harmlessly for illustrative
purposes, let us recognize G as the genomic trait made up of the genetic contributions to the
adaptive migration behaviors typical in populations A and B. So, the frequency of adaptive
trait G will be relatively high in both A and B, and low in C. Suppose that at a time, t1, these
frequencies are 90% in A, 91% in B, and just 3% in poorly adapted C. Next the three popula-
tions face a shared selective pressure: winter’s arrival. They respond by migrating. The relatively
many birds with trait G in populations A and B tend to fare better than the few birds in those
populations who lack G and follow more challenging migration routes. Consequently, by time
t2 suppose that G has increased in frequency to 91% in A, and 92% in B. In contrast, G falls
to 2% in C over the same time period, t1–t2, due to the sorts of stochastic affects that often
influence populations of such small size. And from t2 to a later time, t3, this trend continues:
G rises to 92% in A and 93% in B, and falls to 1% in C.
In this example we can view a kind of trait response similarity as among important causes.29
One event occurring over period t1–t2 is the G trait frequency in population A responding in
a way similar to B’s. This, like many types of similarity, is relative—in this case relative to C ’s
response. More exactly, theG trait frequency responses of populationsA andB during t1–t2 are
much more similar to each other than either’s is to C ’s. Moreover, there is another event of this
type at the later period t2–t3, where again A and B respond more similarly to each other than
either does relative to C. And we can say that the first of these events is one of the contributing
causes of the second: part of the reason that the responses inA andB over the later time period
are muchmore similar to each other than either is to response inC, is that the responses between
A and B were much more similar to each other than to C during the preceding time period as
well.
27There is some disagreement between metaphysicians focusing on causation, about what kinds of things can be
causes. Some argue that only events can be causes, others argue that facts can be causes, and so on (Schaffer 2016).
I assume that claims of the form “trait similarity, t, causes X” can be translated into the language of any of these
competing views. For example, if only events are causes, then the translation would be something like “event E
causes X in virtue of the trait similarity, t, involved in E”.
28Bensch et al. represent these populations in their Table 2 using different letters for labels.
29In more general terms Barker andWilson (2010) highlight this type of similarity, though not its causal status.
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Similar examples could also show how trait similarities (values of variable t) over one period
can help increase other causal variables at later periods. When two populations A and B are
more similar to each other in various respects than either is to C, this can help lead to more
gene flow between A and B than between either of those and C, for example. And here the
feedback theory again predicts such feedback is common and important within lineages, not
merely possible.
Figure 2(c) puts together this section’s two key ideas—the relevance of feedback relations,
and population level trait similarity being yet another variable that is both cause and effect—and
contrasts them against two existing views. One of these, in figure 2(a), is an example narrow
cause view, one that underlies Mayr’s BSC; the other, in figure 2(b), is an existing alternative to
such narrow cause views. Although that alternative, articulated in Barker and Wilson (2010),
is more comprehensive about causes than narrow cause views, it retains from them the idea that




Figure 2: Three-way Comparison of Views of Evolving Lineages. 2(a) is an example narrow cause view.
2(b) is an existing alternative to narrow cause views (found in Barker and Wilson 2010). 2(c) combines
some of the ideas so far proposed here as part of the feedback theory.
One way to see that the more comprehensive view depicted in figure 2(c) fits better with the
familiar idea that evolving lineages are dynamic, persisting things, is to consider how it removes
the motivation for thinking—as we saw Mayr did and others do—that the relevant question
for a species concept to answer is: what are the main causes of persisting trait similarities be-
tween conspecific populations? Because similarity is now a variable just like all the others, and
feedback relations feature between these, all those variables are effect variables in addition to
causal variables. There is no reason to single out similarity as a special effect whose causes we
should enshrine within a definition of ‘species’ or other evolving lineage terms. Indeed, no one
of the variables is a priori more special than the others, as either cause or effect. Accordingly we
should change the very form of what we think is the relevant question. It is not about seeking
the most important causes of this or that effect, but rather about which suite of variables are
most prominent as both causes and effects entering feedback relations that constitute a dynamic
30See especially figure 5 in Barker and Wilson (2010).
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and persisting lineage system. We do not fix on one very specific causal relation that occurs in
fits and starts. We focus on whole lineage systems that cycle through feedback relations holding
integratively between a variety of variables, perhaps uncovering tipping points, bi-stability, and
other features of feedback systems.
In abstract terms this may seem a shift to a more bird’s eye view of evolving lineages: instead
of emphasizing a kind of cohesion that is a trait similarity effect variable inside a lineage system,
we ascend to view the system as a whole, where its overall integration comes into focus. We
saw that encompassing views of such lineages have attempted to initiate a similar shift, but
without being exact enough about both the implicated system-wide integrative cohesion, and
the role of causal variables within it. That inexactness has left the idea that evolving lineages
are dynamic persisting things, at the metapopulation level, vulnerable. Critics have wondered
whether such higher-level things are illusory in a way—whether they appear to themselves be
biological entities doing things, when really they are epiphenomenal artifacts or signals trickling
up to the metapopulation level from causal processes happening strictly at lower levels (e.g.,
Cracraft 1989b; Wilkins 2018).
But further conceptualizing the roles of feedback relations being proposed here will allow us
to be more exact than encompassing views. As a feedback system, one of the things an evolving
lineage would do is contribute to its own dynamic continuation and changes of state.31 This is
seen in other feedback systems, whether a termite’s mound or a turbo engine. Take the feedback
out of those and the quantitative and qualitative differences would be profound.
7 Metapopulation Feedback Cohesion and Variable Spaces for Depicting It
To get more exact than encompassing views about both integrative cohesion and how causes
are involved in it, consider two key ideas. One is viewing an evolving lineage as a metapopula-
tion feedback system whose integrative cohesion is a specific type of diachronic cohesion of the
overall system, often coming in various and fluctuating degrees or intensities. The other idea is
that feedback relations between the identified causal variables within the system are what real-
ize (or implement) this cohesion, while its fluctuating degree or intensity is a function of the
frequencies and magnitudes of those feedback relations.
To spell out these ideas, first let ‘metapopulation feedback system’ refer to any metapopula-
tion featuring recurring causal variables of the sorts described above (e.g., table 3), and wherein
values for these variables sometimes feed back into later values of those variables.
These systems can vary in at least two ways. The values of their variables can range in mag-
nitude, and the feedback relations between variables can range in frequency. When a metapop-
ulation features both relatively high frequencies and magnitudes, let us say it has a high degree
of metapopulation feedback cohesion, or M . When a metapopulation features relatively low fre-
quencies and magnitudes, it features low M . More mixed or intermediate frequencies and
magnitudes correspond to intermediate M values. So M represents a property (or state) that
a metapopulation can have over some time period(s) and which can vary by degree. Thus M
is essentially diachronic, not synchronic, even if particular ways of representing it sometimes
conceal this.
Perhaps the ideal way to determine values ofM involves repeated interventional (experimen-
tal) testing to detect frequencies and magnitudes of feedback relations with relatively exacting
precision. But that will often be practically impossible. Rather than speculate here on practically
31This is not to deny that components of the feedback relations at the metapopulation level are materially deter-
mined by lower level entities and relations and activities. Materialism and recognition of higher level processes go
together (Sober 1980, 1999).
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superior means of detection, I want to use simplified variable spaces to show how mathematical
and visual means of indirectly depictingM values can help with clarifying and stating conditions
for being an evolving lineage. Here I am inspired by Godfrey-Smith (2009), who has shown
how powerful this approach can be in the different context of theorizing about what constitutes
natural selection within a single population.32 In addition to addressing a different biological
system, Godfrey-Smith was not discussing feedback relations in particular. But more generally
he was, as I am, trying to investigate constitutive conditions in a system where relevant variables
are both continuous and complexly related. His simplified variable spaces proved much more
suited to and insightful for this than more traditional methods from philosophy (Sterelny 2011,
489–90). Perhaps more ambitiously than Godfrey-Smith, I will try to show how clumping in
such a space (over time) can be precisely characterized, though the truth or falsity of the main
ideas in the feedback theory do not depend on this particular way of expressing them.33
Start with just one variable, g, a time period t1–t2 that spans several generations, and two
populations, A and B. During t1–t2, there will be some number of generations (0 or greater)
in which genes flowed from A to B, and some number for flow from B to A. We can take the
average of those numbers as the frequency component of g. The flow of genes in a generation
from A to B will also have a magnitude, e.g., one measured by the proportion of migrants
involved in the process. Likewise in the direction from B to A. The average of these two
magnitudes can serve as the magnitude component of g. We can then choose a mathematical
operation that multiplies the frequency component andmagnitude component so that all results
of this are scaled between 0 and 1. Applying this operation here would give an overall value for
g in our example of populations A and B over t1–t2.
Metapopulations often contain more than two populations. To figure g for such metapopu-
lations, we can average over the g values for each possible pairing of populations in the metapop-
ulation.
Suppose we can similarly capture the frequency and magnitude of the other causal variables
occurring within metapopulation feedback systems. For a metapopulation we can then arrive
at values between 0 and 1 for each of those variables additional to g. For illustrative purposes,
figure 3 represents just two variables in addition to g, and features the three of these as axes of
a three-dimensional variable space. We could then plot the location of metapopulations in this
space. Their locations represent their respectiveM values, in what we can call anM space.
8 Conditions for Being an Evolving Lineage
If we propose M as the specification of the integrative cohesion that we saw is discussed by
some authors, how should we use this and the aid of variable spaces to help address the evolving
lineage problem?
First consider that the number of metapopulations that are mere candidates, in the most
minimal sense, for being evolving lineages is massive. Any n-tuple of any populations is a
candidate, including the n-tuple consisting of a particular bacterial population on my apple and
a slug population on the island ofMontreal.34 Given this, and representingM values via (g, s, t)
32Biologists Queller and Strassmann (2009) use a similar strategy on the topic of what constitutes being an
organism.
33To be as useful as possible, variable space expression will need to sort through various methodological decisions
and adopt conventions about how best to relate measures of different variables. But that sort of fine grained and
technical work is significantly downstream of this paper, which instead is offering the prior conceptual clarifications
and motivation for that further work.
34I set aside whether an n-tuple of populations is a candidate when n = 1.
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Figure 3: Plotting M Values for metapopulations in M Space. Black ovals represent metapopulations.
Many will cluster near point zero, being the poorest candidates for evolving lineages on the feedback
theory. The clustering of metapopulations in the back top right region reflects the hypothesis that para-
digmatic evolving lineages exist. The location of the Euphydryas editha metapopulation exemplifies the
1969 claim of Ehrlich and Raven that a California metapopulation within this group features very little
gene flow between populations, but seemingly high t and s. The A. imperialis + A. geniculata example re-
flects the implication in Barbará et al. (2007, 1990) that sympatric groups from these two named species
feature low but non-zero g, s, and t. The poplars + cottonwoods example is from Templeton (1989) who
claimed low levels of t and s for this inter-specific group, despite significant levels of gene flow between
the involved poplars and cottonwoods. Design aspects of this figure are taken directly from figure 3.1
and figure 5.1 in Godfrey-Smith (2009).
location in figure 3’s simplified M space, the vast majority of candidate metapopulations will
probably haveM values at or relatively very near (0, 0, 0). This is so when adding dimensions to
theM space as well. For discussing those more complex spaces as well as simpler ones, let the
meeting of axes at the point where all variable values are zero be called point zero. So (0, 0, 0)
is point zero in figure 3. If many species are evolving lineages in some way that sets them apart
from other metapopulations, then on the current proposal it is predicted that some relatively
small number of candidate metapopulations will form one or more clumps in M space, some
distance from point zero. And then there will probably be a grading off between any of those
clumps and point zero, representing intermediate cases (cf. Godfrey-Smith 2009 on “Darwinian
populations”). This is just to say we should not expect all metapopulations to sort into just two
discrete groups, those near point zero and those in one or more other clumps that may represent
species or some other relatively clear type of evolving lineage.
Assuming that is the case, there will probably be no sharp line separating evolving lineages
from all other metapopulations. It will often be better to talk of degrees. A metapopulation
consisting of both Alcantarea imperialis and Alcantarea geniculata Bromeliad populations may,
for example, be far enough from point zero (see Barbará et al. 2007, 1990) that we should count
it as an evolving lineage to some degree even if it isn’t located in a clump that we associate with,
say, a species region of the M space in particular. More generally, both the increasing structure
that systematists are finding within metapopulations and the surprising extent of evolutionary
connectivity between them (Mallet, Besansky, and Hahn 2016) give two large reasons to expect
such intermediate cases (or less integrated types) of evolving lineages.
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But this hardly forces us to count any old metapopulation located some distance from point
zero as an actively evolving lineage. Even if several sets of conditions are each sufficient in usual
contexts for being an evolving lineage, a thing will not be such a lineage without satisfying
at least one of those various sets. To capture the popular idea that many evolving lineages
are relatively distinct from each other while popping out, to varying degrees, against the noisy
backdrop of mere metapopulations, the feedback theory proposes that one of these sufficient
sets will contain at least three and perhaps four conditions.
8.1 First condition: tumbling addition
To grasp the first condition, start with reverse reasoning: think about ways in which a metapop-
ulation could fail to be a whole evolving lineage according to the feedback theory. One way is
to be less than a whole evolving lineage, in virtue of leaving out one or more populations that
are sufficiently connected to it by feedback relations. In such a case of failure, at least one pop-
ulation left out is about as connected by feedback relations to the metapopulation’s constituent
populations as each of them is to each other. Adding such a mistakenly left-out population to
the metapopulation would thus diminish itsM value little, or not at all, or even raise it. So when
a metapopulation does not fail in this way, when it is not mistakenly leaving out a population,
it would seem to be satisfying an opposite condition: if any out-group population were added
to it, its M value would tumble.35 If and only if a metapopulation satisfies this tumbling addi-
tion condition, the metapopulation averts “less than whole” failure—call it a tumbling addition
metapopulation.36 This is for relations between causal variables within it to be overall of much
greater frequency and magnitude than they would be in any more inclusive group that includes
that metapopulation plus any other population. What counts as “significant” or “greater”—and
so what counts as a tumble in M space rather than, say, a slip—will be a relative matter. For
example, if a drop in a metapopulation’s M value upon adding any further population is rel-
atively similar to drops seen when adding out-group populations to what are widely deemed
paradigmatic evolving lineages in roughly the same region ofM space, then this is a reason to
count the drop as significant. Conversely, if the drop in M value upon population addition is
much smaller than compared to the paradigmatic cases in roughly the same region ofM space,
that is a reason to not count the drop as significant.37 And even in these relative or comparative
terms, we should not expect sharp lines.
8.2 Second condition: climbless subtraction
On the feedback theory, another way for a metapopulation to fail to be a whole evolving lineage
is to be more than a whole evolving lineage, by letting in one or more populations that are not
sufficiently connected by feedback.38 So in such failure, there is at least one constituent popu-
lation whose omission from the metapopulation would result in that metapopulation’sM value
35This is because all left-out populations in such a case would be rightfully left out: none is sufficiently connected
by feedback to the metapopulation, and so addition of any would cause the metapopulation’sM value to tumble.
36The previous sentence characterized this epistemically, the next does so ontologically.
37Seeing that what counts as significant is relative to what is going on with paradigmatic evolving lineages in
roughly the same region of M space also allows the present account to recognize multiple levels of evolving lineages,
i.e., evolving lineages at different levels ofM space. For instance, it can recognize higher grade and lower grade
evolving lineages, where those of higher grade haveM values (degrees of metapopulation feedback cohesion) falling
within a range that is distinctly higher thanM values clustering in a different range. Because of this the conditions
proposed here can also accommodate nesting relationships between evolving lineages of different grades.
38It is possible to fail in both “more than whole” and “less than whole” ways simultaneously.
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climbing; the lesser feedback connections to that population were a drag on the overall magni-
tude or frequency of feedback relations in the metapopulation, so with that drag removed the
magnitude or frequency of the feedback relations, and so the degree of metapopulation feedback
cohesion, climbs markedly. To not fail in this way, a metapopulation would seemingly be sat-
isfying an opposite condition: if any one population were subtracted from the metapopulation,
the metapopulation’s M value would not significantly climb. If and only if a metapopulation
satisfies this climbless subtraction condition, it averts “more than whole” failure and can be called
a climbless subtraction metapopulation.39 This is for relations between causal variables within
it to be overall of much less magnitude or frequency than they would be in any more exclusive
group that omits any of the constituent populations. Again this is a relative matter of degree.
8.3 Third condition: non-zero M value
The third condition is a metapopulation’sM value being some distance from point zero. I leave
“some” vague, intending only to capture the idea that some of the feedback relations discussed
here are present in metapopulations made into evolving lineages by those relations.
8.4 Fourth condition: descent condition
This last condition is more tentative than the others but deserves consideration. It is being
a numerically distinct ancestor or descendent of other metapopulations that satisfy the three
preceding conditions. Including this condition along with the others should be attractive to
those who conceive of lineages as essentially ancestor-descendant sequences in a sense that rules
out processes akin to mere internal growth as sufficing for lineagehood. It will be less attractive
to authors with more liberal views of lineagehood (e.g., Bouchard 2010).
Summing up, the feedback theory proposes that a metapopulation is an evolving lineage of
at least one type if the frequency andmagnitude of its feedback relations are such that it is both a
tumble addition metapopulation (it averts “less than whole” failure) and a climbless subtraction
metapopulation (it averts “more than whole” failure), and is some distance from point zero; we
may wish to add: and it is an ancestor or descendant of other metapopulations that satisfy those
preceding conditions. This is to suggest these three or four conditions are promising candidates
for being among those constitutive of being an evolutionary lineage.
9 FurtherWork
Before summarizing the paper’s argument, let me flag a few of the interesting ideas that could
be developed and tested in light of the feedback theory of evolving lineages.
Expressing the theory with the help of variable spaces could clarify and help test the con-
troversial idea that the species rank is especially distinct or objective in comparison to all more
inclusive taxa ranks.40 In the confines of the feedback theory, and as figure 3 was drawn to
depict, that idea would predict that most metapopulations that clearly satisfy the conditions for
being an evolving lineage would cluster within one reasonably distinct portion ofM space. The
idea would allow that that portion extends with vague and irregular boundaries across a large
portion of M space, acknowledging various patterns in causal variables that suffice for being
an evolving lineage of the species type. But the idea would suggest we could nonetheless draw
some reasonably distinct (of course not sharp) threshold around this portion ofM space, with
39The previous sentence characterized this epistemically, the next does so ontologically.
40See Ereshefsky (1991) for a relatively old but still helpful review of this idea.
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this threshold being a significant distance from point zero, and those metapopulations outside
of it and not very near point zero being relatively much more diffusely scattered between the
species portion ofM space and point zero. Empirical testing could check if this is so. Claims
about there being a reasonably distinct sub-species rank could be similarly tested.
Some version of species pluralism could be checked. Take groups that are already viewed as
excellent candidates for being species. Plot theirM values inM space. If they form more than
one cluster, this fits with a kind of pluralism. And whether the pluralism threatens realism or
unity about the species rank (Ereshefsky 1992b, 1998; Mishler 1999) could be assessed partly
by the relative distance between species clusters. The greater the relative distances, the larger
the threat; the smaller the relative distances, the weaker the threat.
The theory gives a framework in which to discuss disputes about particular metapopulations.
Templeton (1989), for instance, implied that a metapopulation of poplars and one of cotton-
woods were separate evolving species lineages, despite frequent gene flow between them. There
is temptation for BSC advocates to disagree and see these as two parts of a larger species lineage.
Templeton’s case would seem supported to the extent that the poplars+cottonwoods metapopu-
lation was significantly distant from point zero only along the g axis; but with increased distance
on other axes too, Templeton would lose support.
The relevance of candidate causal variables forM values could be tested. Relevance would
diminish for variables that tend across many cases to have high values mostly when other vari-
ables tend to low values; it would be supported for those variables whose higher values tend to
coincide with higher values in others. And the legitimacy of that test—and assumptions of the
feedback theory itself—could be tested in various ways. For instance, the more that indepen-
dently judged “good species” display relatively high values on multiple variables, and suppos-
edly “unlikely species” display quite mixed or low variable values, the more plausible the theory.
When those predicted correspondences fail, the theory could offer checkable explanations. It
could, for instance, explain lack of correspondence in a case of a “good species” judgment by sug-
gesting that although only one or a few variable values were found to be high, they are probably
very high; then we could check whether that is true. A converse type of explanation for failed
“unlikely species” correspondence could be checked, and other explanations could be generated
in either case. However, the more that various sorts of clumping inM space are suggestive of
evolving lineage patterns, the more reason we would have to discount disagreeable prior judg-
ments about “good” and “unlikely” groups, and revise our underlying pre-theoretic assumptions
to better accord with the feedback theory of evolving lineages.
10 Summary
The feedback theory of evolving lineages tries to shed light on what constitutes evolving lin-
eages such as many species. This paper’s conclusion is not, as noted in the introduction, that the
feedback theory is true or probably true or now well enough supported that we should adopt
it. Rather, it is that it would be worthwhile for some of the interdisciplinary community of
researchers working on species and evolving lineages to collaboratively further develop and em-
pirically test the feedback theory of evolving lineages elaborated here.
The main argument presented above for that conclusion can be summarized as takingmodus
ponens form. Premise 1, which was developed and defended mainly in Sections 2–5 of the
paper, was that if the feedback theory of evolving lineages shows clear promise for meeting
the exactness and comprehensiveness desiderata inferred from the strengths and weaknesses of
existing work on evolving lineages (recall Table 1 and Table 2), then further development and
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testing of that theory would be worthwhile as concluded. Premise 2, elaborated and supported
mainly in Sections 6–9, was that the theory indeed shows such promise.
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